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1. Introduction  
The ability to generate random numbers is an important resource in many areas of science and 
technology: computer security, cryptography, probabilistic computation (Monte Carlo), over-
Turing computing techniques (e.g. randomized algorithms), simulations, labeling of prepaid 
and gift cards, industrial testing, online hazard games and automata, scientific research etc. 
The vast majority of today's computers are deterministic (e.g. PCs, tablets and mobile 
phones), and so they can not per se create random numbers: that task is left to a random 
number generator (RNG). Random number generators are usually categorized as either 
pseudo random (PRNG) or physical or "true" random number generators (TRNG).     
A PRNG is a mathematical formula, or more generally a deterministic algorithm which, 
starting from a certain initial number (seed) that defines the initial state, produces a string of 
numbers that looks random in the sense that it possesses a certain set of desirable statistical 
properties, but in fact is completely deterministic and highly losslessly compressible by 
definition [1], neither of which should be a characteristic of a truly random sequence. 
Although there is no criterion for an algorithm to be named a "PRNG", the only 
undisputable characteristic of any PRNG is that it is provably non-random because it is 
already known how to predict all the numbers in the pseudo random sequence, namely by 
using the very PRNG algorithm. Nevertheless, PRNGs are very frequently used: their 
popularity stems from the fact that they can be realized as a piece of software and run on a 
computer or programmable devices (mobile phone, smart card, etc.) thus offering an illusion 
that the device now also has access to random numbers without any cost in additional 
hardware! However, while algorithmically generated pseudo random numbers can be used for 
some applications, they are by construction deterministic and therefore, at least in theory, 
predictable which makes them risky for use in cryptography [2] as well as frequent cause of 
erroneous results in statistical calculations and simulations [3-4].  
A non-determinism is sought in physical RNGs, notably quantum random number 
generators (QRNG) that extract random numbers by performing repeated measurements on a 
certain, specially prepared quantum systems [5-9]. The rationale behind QRNGs is that 
quantum theory allows the existence of fundamentally random and unpredictable physical 
processes such that one can, in principle, extract truly random numbers from them.  
This paper is organized as follows.  First, we present an original analysis of two well 
known optical quantum random number generating principles. Next, based on gained insights, 
we construct a new bit extracting principle with significantly improved characteristics. 
Finally, we build and test a physical QRNG based on that principle, using  two home-made 
single-photon detectors described elsewhere [13], and  logic circuits programmed within the 
Altera MAX3000 family CPLD chip. Notable novelty in our approach to random number 
generation is that we prove limits of deviation from randomness by calculating them from a 
set of simple measurements. 
3 
 
 
2. State tomography spatial method (BSR) 
A well known beam splitting principle of generating random binary numbers (bits) [10], [5] is 
shown in Fig. 1. A non polarized light described by ߰ ൌ భ√మ ሺ|ܪۄ ൅ |ܸۄሻ is incoming onto a 
balanced linearly polarizing beam splitter (PBS). A source of such light could, for example, 
contain many atoms that emit photons independently of each other at random times or a well-
saturated laser in which the photon emitting time information is erased. The action of PBS can 
be described by the operator భ√మሺ|ܪۄۃܪ| ൅ |ܸۄۃܸ|ሻ with understanding that the horizontal 
linear polarized component will exit on one output arm of the PBS and vertical will exit on the 
other. When non-polarized light enters an ideal PBS followed by two identical detectors D0 
and D1, as shown in Fig. 1, there will be an equal probability of a photon being detected by 
either detector. A photon detection by the detector D0 is defined as generation of bit value “0” 
whereas a detection by D1 is defined as generation of a bit value "1". Because the value of a 
random number is identified with the position at which the photon is detected, this method is 
sometimes referred to as "spatial". 
 
Fig. 1. Beam splitter quantum random number generator. Single-frame excerpts from video 
recordings of metallic objects concealed by opaque plastic tape. (a) Utility blade. (b)  
The setup shown in Fig. 1 generates random outcomes due to the fact that the quantum 
mechanical system being measured contains no information that could influence which axis 
the photon state is (more likely) to project. Randomness is therefore a consequence of no 
information being transferred between the system (setup) and the photon. In fact quite 
generally, if one imagines a RNG as a "black box", bits coming out of that box must not 
contain any information whatsoever about what is inside the box simply because being 
random they do not contain any information about anything. 
Even though the described generating method in theory generates perfect random 
numbers, we will show that it is very sensitive to small imperfections in the experimental 
setup. Bit sequences generated by any physical RNG generally feature two types of deviations 
from randomness which seem unavoidable: bias and correlations among bits. Bias is a 
measure of uneven probability of generating ones and zeros and is defined as: 
ܾ ൌ ݌ሺ1ሻ െ ݌ሺ0ሻ2 ൌ ݌ሺ1ሻ െ
1
2.                                              ሺ1ሻ 
Following the above definition, an estimate of bias from data is obtained as: 
෠ܾ ൌ ∑ ݔ௜
ே௜ୀଵ
ܰ .                                                                     ሺ2ሻ 
with the variance of 1 ሺ2√ܰሻ⁄ . Sources of bias in the BSR method are: (1) unbalanced beam 
splitter; and (2) uneven detection efficiencies of the two detectors. In the BSR random number 
generator, it is virtually impossible to eliminate bias by shear manufacturing precision of the 
components to a level that would not be (easily) detectable by statistical tests. Bias itself can 
be strongly reduced or eliminated altogether by simple postprocessing techniques [11]. 
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However, exact de-biasing algorithms (such as Von-Neumann [12]) work only if there are no 
correlations among bits or if they are negligible. 
Unlike bias, which can be expressed by a single number, correlations among bits can be 
arbitrarily complex and generally cannot be expressed by a single quantity. Nevertheless the 
description can be simplified by realizing that memory effects in detectors, that cause 
correlations among bits, are strongly localized in time [13]. If the mean period between 
detections is long enough, only neighboring bits are non-negligibly correlated. Under that 
assumption, bit generation is a Markov process and correlation among bits can be fully 
characterized by only the serial autocorrelation coefficient with lag 1. Serial autocorrelation 
coefficients are defined as (see Ref. [14]): 
ܽ௞ ൌ
∑ ሺݔ௜ െ ݔҧሻሺݔ௜ା௞ െ ݔҧሻேି௞௜ୀଵ
∑ ሺݔ௜ െ ݔҧሻேି௞௜ୀଵ ଶ
                                                  ሺ3ሻ 
where ܽ௞ is a serial autocorrelation coefficient with lag ݇ and ܰ is number of bits in the 
sequence. For a Markov process ܽ௞ ൌ ܽଵ௞. For finite ܰ, an estimate given by Eq. (3)  has 1 
sigma Gaussian statistical error of 1 √ܰ െ ݇⁄ .  
In the BSR method, correlations among bits are caused mainly by dead time and afterpulsing 
in detectors. To see that, let us a suppose that faint continuous Poisson random light, such as 
for example generated by an LED or well saturated laser, is shone upon the beamsplitter 
causing photons to be detected by each detector with a mean detection period ߬. Let us further 
suppose that the two detectors have identical dead time ߬ௗ. In case that the next photon 
"arrives" in less than ߬ௗ after the previous one, it can either hit the detector that is in the dead 
state or would get detected by the other detector thus contributing to the negative 
autocorrelation of the sequence of generated bits. The leading (in magnitude) is 
autocorrelation coefficient ܽଵ, henceforth denoted ܽ and referred to as "autocorrelation". Its 
magnitude is approximately equal to probability ݌ௗ that a photon "falls" into the dead time: 
ܽ ൌ െ݌ௗ ൌ ݁
ିఛ೏ ఛൗ െ 1 ൎ െ ߬ௗ߬                                                    ሺ4ሻ 
where the last approximation is valid for τd << τ. In a realistic case, the mean photon 
frequency could be 1 MHz (i.e. ߬ = 1000 ns) and dead time ߬ௗ = 40 ns leading to ܽ ≈ -0.04: an 
imperfection statistically detectable with only a few hundred generated bits! Even with an 
unrealistically short dead time, at a sufficiently high detection (i.e. bit production) rate, the 
correlations become un-tolerably high. The highest counting rate of the detector is 1/߬ௗ and in 
that limit ܽଵ is approaches -1. To achieve lower correlation one needs to operate at a lower 
detection frequency, but then only a small portion of detector capabilities can be exploited for 
random number generation. In our previous work [13] we showed that correlation does not 
vanish in the low detection frequency end either: instead, it asymptotically reaches the value 
of the afterpulsing probability ݌௔ which is usually on the order of 0.01 െ 0.1.  
 
In previous work [13] we have already noted that positive and negative correlation 
mechanisms cancel each other at a certain detection rate. Since the two processes are 
independent of each other, the resulting correlation ܽ is a sum of the two contributions: 
ܽ ൌ ݌௔ െ
߬ௗ
߬ .                                                                  ሺ5ሻ 
and vanishes for a detection rate ଴݂ ൌ 1 ߬⁄ ൌ ݌௔ ߬ௗ.⁄   For the detectors used in [13], identical 
to the ones used in this study, ݌௔ ൌ 0.031 and ߬ௗ ൌ 24 ns yielding ଴݂ ൎ 1.3 Mcps, which is 
quite low with respect to their counting capability of over 25 Mcps. 
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In this work we go further by noting an effect that, in principle, enable total elimination of the 
autocorrelation. First we note that by ignoring detections that came from one detector in less 
than a prescribed blanking time ∆ݐ after a detection by the other detector, helps to reduce 
correlations significantly. Specifically, in order to completely remove the anti-correlation 
caused by the dead time, it would be enough to take ∆ݐ any higher than the dead time because 
then the dead time would have no effect on photons selected for generation of random 
numbers. However, positive autocorrelation due to afterpulses appearing after ∆ݐ would be 
left over causing a small positive autocorrelation. In order to overcame that, we note that by 
taking a suitable ∆ݐ, slightly smaller that the dead time, one can obtain, in principle, an 
arbitrarily high detection frequency ଴݂ at which the two competing effects (negative and 
positive) cancel each other. Note that below ଴݂ the total autocorrelation is positive due to 
dominant effect of the afterpulsing, whereas above ଴݂ autocorrelation turns negative due to 
dominant effect of the dead time. The circuit shown in Fig 2. provides the function of the BSR 
method with blanking (omitting) of any event(s) that come sooner than ∆ݐ after the previous 
one. Due to the discrete delay times available in the CPLD chip, the blanking period ∆ݐ is 
adjustable in the range from 5.6 ns in steps of 4.0 ns, while dead times of the two detectors D0 
and D1 used in this work are fixed to 24 ns. 
 
Fig. 2. Logic circuit that implements BSR method. Each flip-flops generates a narrow pulse 
(~ 2 ns) following a (positive going edge of a) pulse from the respective detector. The OR gate 
interleaves in time pulses from the two flip-flops and uses that to trigger a blanking pulse of 
duration ∆ݐ.  width  sequences  and The Strobe output generates one short pulse whenever a 
pulse from a detector arrives except if two consecutive are closer then ∆ݐ ൎ 2݌௪ in time in 
which case only first pulse causes Strobe signal and the other is suppressed. 
By checking the higher-lag autocorrelation coefficients we find that a detection rate of 10 
Mcps is a good trade-off between a high bit production rate and approximate Markov chain 
characteristic of the generated sequence. The lowest autocorrelation at 10 Mcps is obtained 
for ∆ݐ ൌ 17.6 ns and is equal to ሺ280 േ 32ሻ · 10ି଺. Using that value of the blanking period,  
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Fig. 5. The T1T2 principle QRBG. Time-wise random pulse train from REG toggles the T-type 
flip-flop such that the period between the first and second event is measured by the Restartable 
Clock 1 and the period between second and third event is measured by the Restartable Clock 2. 
Accumulated counts in the counters are subtracted and a random bit is generated only if the two 
periods are not equal.  
The crucial insight achieved in [9] is that the clock which measures photon time intervals 
must be started in synchronization with beginning of each interval, otherwise the method 
would produce correlated bits even if fed by perfectly random events. This was not 
understood in previous art, like for example in [7] where the clock was free-running which 
must have yielded correlated bits, but it was not noted probably because clock frequency 
(~10MHz) was much higher than the source mean frequency (~10kHz) and in that case 
correlations are small. Correlations rise quickly as the ratio of frequencies of clock and source 
of random events becomes smaller [7]. The improved T1T2 circuit, shown in Fig. 5, is 
theoretically exact regardless of the ratio of frequencies of the time measuring clock and REG. 
Afterpulsing in detectors causes some correlation, but much smaller than in BSR method 
because they appear at random times and merely slightly modify the exponential distribution.  
 
4. Combined spatio temporal method with improved randomness (COMBO) 
The two above described random number generating methods offer a range of randomness 
quality, bits-per-photon efficiency and resilience to hardware imperfections. However, at the 
present level of technology, even with the most optimal method, the leftover randomness 
imperfections are typically larger than what is acceptable by general applications. As 
illustrated there is always some hardware detail that limits the randomness and which cannot 
be further improved with a given level of hardware technology.   
In order to arrive to a better randomness of generated bits, one can use deterministic 
postprocessing (extractor algorithms [15-16], resilient functions [17-18]) or non-deterministic 
postprocessing (i.e. using additional sources of entropy). Postprocessing comes with a price of 
additional hardware and/or software resources. More importantly, complex postprocessing 
may render it impossible to find a mathematical relation between parameters of the hardware 
and deviation from randomness, which is a basis for scientific provability of randomness of 
the generator. In order to simplify postprocessing or avoid it altogether, it is therefore 
legitimate to ask whether a better bit extraction method can be construed that would both 
feature lower sensitivity to hardware imperfections and provability of randomness of the 
extracted bits. 
To that end we proceed by noting that in the BSR method (explained in the previous section), 
there are two independent random processes, each of which allows for random bit extraction. 
Namely, the time when a photon is detected (by either detector) is, at least in theory, 
completely independent of where it is detected (by which detector). Therefore, one can exploit 
temporal information of a train of photons detected by either detector D0 or D1 to generate a 
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sequence of random bits via T1T2 method, and at the same time use spatial information of the 
same detected photons to generate an independent sequence of random bits via BSR method. 
This method we name "COMBO" as it combines the two random number generating 
principles.  
The optical part of the COMBO RNG is shown in Fig. 6. It contains two near-identical photon 
counting detectors D0 and D1. It is basically the BSR setup (Fig. 1) with adjustable ratio of 
zeros to ones. 
 
Fig. 6. Optical part of the COMBO quantum random number consists of the beamsplitter PBS, 
detectors D0 and D1, fixed neutral filter NDF and variable neutral filter VNDF for bias 
adjustment. 
 
For the random number generation, we used variable-power CW light source made of a red 
LED (Hamamatsu L7868, ߣ ൌ 670 nm, Δߣ ൌ 30 nm FWHM) supplied by an adjustable 
current source and coupled to a single mode fiber (custom shielded SM600 fiber from 
Thorlabs). The beam splitter BS is a fusion fiber 50:50 splitter (Thorlabs FC632-50B-FC). 
The neutral density filter NDF reduces intensity of light by a factor of 0.9 whereas the 
variable filter VNDF making possible a fine adjustment of the bias ௌܾ of the BSR section 
down to ሺ0.5 േ 0.001) with stability better than േ0.0005 during experiments. 
Photon detections from the two detectors are combined by the electrical circuit shown in Fig. 
7, which functions as follows. In order to extract the timing information, pulse trains from the 
two detectors are interleaved by a summing circuit to form a single train of pulses which is 
then processed according to the T1T2 method with the sub-circuit displayed in Fig. 5. This 
yields one string of random bits, let us denote it with ࢀ for "time". At the same time, the two 
pulse trains are processed according to the BSR method by the sub-circuit shown in Fig. 2. 
This yields the other string of random bits related to the space information, let us denote it 
with ࡿ for "space". Each of these two independent bit strings will have its own bias and 
autocorrelation, let us denote them as ሺ்ܾ, ்ܽሻ and ሺ ௌܾ, ܽௌሻ respectively. 
 
Fig. 7. Functional schematic of the circuit for realizing the COMBO random number 
generating method.  
Since, in principle, the BSR method produces one bit per detected photon and T1T2 produces 
one bit per two detected photons, we need to decide how to combine these two bit streams. 
One way is to omit every second BSR bit: this would result in a string with much lower 
(squared) auto correlation but would not affect the bias. In order to improve both on bias and 
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correlation, the COMBO method uses XOR of non-overlapping pairs of consecutive bits from 
the BSR method yielding new string ࢅሺܾ௒, ܽ௒ሻ. This is accomplished by the D-type flip-flop 
and XOR gate XOR1 shown in the Fig. 7. Finally the two random strings ࢀ and ࢅ are XOR-ed 
(by the gate XOR2) to yield the final string ࡯ሺܾ஼, ܽ஼ሻ. In order to calculate estimates of 
ܾ஼ and ܽ஼ we use two assumptions discussed above: (1) both BSR and T1T2 methods are 
Markov processes; (2) random strings generated by two methods are independent of each 
other. Both assumptions are checked by the data themselves. Note that the T1T2 section is 
only fed by events passed through the blanking filter of the BSR, even though blanking is not 
necessary for that section, in order to prevent too often clocking of the BSR section that would 
induce positive correlation in the string ࡿ. 
For generation of random numbers, the power of the CW source is adjusted such that each 
detector counts with an average frequency of (10.00േ0.05ሻ Mcps, in total 20 million random 
events per second. In principle this would result in random bit generation rate of 10 Mbps 
since the bit production is clocked by T1T2 section which uses 2 detections per bit, however 
due to the blanking the bit rate is approximately 8.0 Mbit/sec.        
In order to estimate quality of randomness at the output (sequence ࡯) sequences ࡿ and ࢀ were 
initially collected from the circuit shown in Fig. 7. Statistics of 2 · 10ଽ bits for string ࡿ and 
1 · 10ଽ for string ࢀ were collected. Statistical analysis according to Eqs. (2) and (3) yielded 
the following estimates: ෠ܾௌ ൌ ሺ227 േ 16ሻ · 10ି଺, ොܽௌ ൌ ሺെ149 േ 32ሻ  · 10ି଺ and ෠்ܾ ൌ
ሺെ125 േ 16ሻ · 10ି଺ , ො்ܽ ൌ ሺ48 േ 32ሻ · 10ି଺. We find that second and further 
autocorrelation coefficients (݇ ൒ 2) for either of the two strings are consistent with the 
Markov hypothesis within statistical uncertainty. For the string ࢅ, which is derived from 
string ࡿ, the following relation holds [11], [19]: 
ܾ௒ ൌ െ2 ௌܾଶ െ 2ܽௌ ൬
1
4 െ ௌܾ
ଶ൰ ൎ െ2 ௌܾଶ െ
ܽௌ
2                                            ሺ6ሻ 
ܽ௒ ൌ 2
ܽௌሺ1 െ ܽௌሻ ௌܾଶ
1 െ 2ሺ1 െ ܽௌሻ ቀ14 െ ௌܾ
ଶቁ
ൎ 4ܽௌ ௌܾଶ                                               ሺ7ሻ 
where the approximations are valid when ܽௌ ا 1 and ௌܾଶ ا 0.25 which is satisfied in our 
case. This yields: ෠ܾ௒ ൌ ሺ75 േ 16ሻ  · 10ି଺, ොܽ௒ ൌ ሺ0 േ 21ሻ · 10ି଺. Again, higher lag 
correlations are consistent with zero within statistical error margins.  
Bit-by-bit XOR-ing of two independent Markov sequences ࢀ and ࢅ yields the final sequence 
࡯ with bias and correlation given by [11]: 
ܾ஼ ൌ 2்ܾܾ௒                                                                                 ሺ8ሻ 
ܽ஼ ൌ ்ܽܽ௒ ൅ 4ሺ்ܾܽ௒ଶ ൅ ܽ௒ܾଶ்ሻ                                               ሺ9ሻ 
The above relations may give an over-optimistic result if the two sequences are correlated, 
that is if normalized cross-correlation coefficients defined as:  
ܻܽܶሺ݇ሻ ൌ
∑ ሺݐ݅ െ ݐҧሻ൫ݕ݅൅݇ െ ݕത൯ܰെ݇݅ൌ1
 ටቀ∑ ሺݐ݅ െ ݐҧሻܰെ݇݅ൌ1 2ቁ ቀ∑ ൫ݕ݅ െ ݕത൯ܰെ݇݅ൌ1
2ቁ
                              ሺ10ሻ 
are non-zero. Estimates of cross-correlation coefficients for lag ݇ in the range ሾെ6, 6ሿ for a 
3 · 10ଽ bits long strings, shown in the Fig. 8. with 1 sigma Gaussian error bars are consistent 
with zero thus confirming the non-correlation hypothesis. 
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Fig. 8. Cross-correlation coefficients of spatial and temporal bit strings in the COMBO 
quantum random number generator. 
Finally, we obtain ෠ܾ஼ ൌ ሺ7.1 േ 1.6ሻ · 10ି଼, ොܽ஼ ൌ ሺ3.7 േ 1.2ሻ · 10ିଵଶ. In order to measure 
errors of that magnitude with 95% C.L. one would need to generate a string of at least 6 · 10ଵଷ 
bits. Thus we prove that any generated string shorter than that is indistinguishable from a true 
random string and in that case there is no need to do any further tests of the generated output. 
Nevertheless, as a cross-check, we perform "standard" statistical analysis of sequences of 10ଽ 
bits by means of the NIST statistical test suite (STS, version 2.2.1) [20] using the default test 
parameters. Results obtained for a typical sequence are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Typical results of the NIST Statistical Test Suite 
Statistical test p-value Proportion/Threshold Pass 
Frequency 0.75186 991/980 Yes 
Block frequency 0.82372 991/980 Yes 
Cumulative sums 0.63859 992/980 Yes 
Runs 0.67868 991/980 Yes 
LongestRun 0.48464 982/980 Yes 
Rank 0.35864 994/980 Yes 
FFT 0.95120 992/980 Yes 
NonOverlappingTemplate 0.44015 990/980 Yes 
OverlappingTemplate 0.18454 992/980 Yes 
Universal 0.97305 989/980 Yes 
ApproximateEntropy 0.56463 992/980 Yes 
RandomExcursions 0.48645 628/622 Yes 
RandomExcursionsVariant 0.44883 628/622 Yes 
Serial 0.47577 989/980 Yes 
LinearComplexity 0.72582 989/980 Yes 
    
 
5. Resilience to hardware failure and signal injection attack 
When a RNG is used in a critical application (e.g. for cryptographic security) it is important 
that it possess a resilience to common hardware failure and allows for robust monitoring of its 
proper functioning. For COMBO RNG, in case that one of the detectors (D0, D1) fails 
completely (i.e. stops generating pulses), the BSR circuit (Fig. 2) will be either stuck to logic 
1 or logic 0, depending on whether D0 or D1 failed, respectively. However the T1T2 section 
will still function normally albeit at only a half rate. As a result, randomness of the output will 
be slightly reduced (to that of the T1T2 section) while the bit production rate will be halved. 
In case of partial reduction of detection rate of one of detectors, BSR section will generate a 
heavily biased but still Markov sequence. In that case, according to Eqs. (8) and (9), 
randomness of output bits should be better that of the T1T2 method alone. This is indeed 
confirmed by an experiment in which average detection frequency of D0 was kept fixed at 
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ሺ10.00 േ 0.05ሻ Mcps while that of D1 ( D݂ଵ) was varied from zero to 10 Mcps. Results plotted 
in Fig. 9. show that, due to rate mismatch between D0 and D1, the BSR section generates 
highly biased and correlated output which improves as D݂ଵ approaches D݂଴. The bias ܾ௒ is out 
of the scope for all points except for D݂ଵ ൌ 10 MHz while autocorrelation ்ܽ is shown. Even 
so, randomness merits of the combined output, namely ܽ஼ and ܾ஼, are improved with respect 
to those of the T1T2 section (்ܽ, ்ܾ) except for D݂ଵ ൌ 0 where the two are equal as expected. 
We further note that if both detectors would fail completely, the T1T2 section would not 
generate any Strobe signals and there would be no output. Therefore, the COMBO RNG is 
robust against detector(s) failure in the sense that as long as there is any output, its 
randomness quality is good.    
     
Fig. 9. Randomness merits (bias and autocorrelation) of the three sequences generated by the 
COMBO RNG in case when one detector is failing. Detection rate of one detector (D0) was 
kept at its nominal rate of 10 Mcps, while rate of the other detector (D1) was varied from 10 
Mcps down to zero simulating its failure. 
Let us now consider the COMBO RNG under attack by injection of a periodic signal which 
causes fake photon detections or "injection events" in detectors. Such an attack could be 
mounted by strong electromagnetic pulses or light flashes. We assume that the injected pulses 
affects equally and simultaneously both detectors. This would in particular be the case for a 
RNG miniaturized to a chip level with the closely spaced of nearly identical characteristics. 
We simulate the attack by mixing the CW light with strong laser pulses (PicoQuant PDL 800-
D with laser head 39 ps FWHM, ߣ ൌ 676 nm) via an additional beamsplitter in front of the of 
the RNG setup (Fig. 6). Detection probability of a laser pulse is greater than 99.7%. In an 
experiment the intensity of CW light was set such that D݂଴ ൌ D݂ଵ ൌ 10.00 േ 0.05 Mcps while 
the periodic frequency of injected laser pulses ( I݂୬୨ୣୡ୲) was varied from zero to 7 MHz. 
Results are shown in Fig. 10. The attack generates a deviation from otherwise exponential 
time interval distribution of detected events (consisting of intertwined detected photons and 
injection events). Since BSR section is not sensitive to the time information it is quite 
insensitive to the attack. We see that the randomness merits of the output string ࡯ stay zero 
within statistical errors for 10ଽ bits up to 7 MHz. However by examining component strings ࢅ 
and ࢀ we also see that randomness does deteriorate with I݂୬୨ୣୡ୲ albeit this would be that is 
apparent at higher yet statistics. Namely, every injected signal generates one additional "1" in 
the string ࡿ. This effect becomes apparent for I݂୬୨ୣୡ୲ ൐ 4.5 MHz when the bias of the string ࢅ 
becomes negative while autocorrelation becomes non-Markov. The T1T2 section is by 
definition more sensitive to time interval distribution and that is clearly visible through 
increasingly negative bias and sharp rise of autocorrelation for  I݂୬୨ୣୡ୲ ൐ 3 MHz.  
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Fig. 10. Randomness merits (bias and autocorrelation) of the three sequences ࢅ, ࢀ and ࡯ 
generated by the COMBO RNG under attack by injection of a periodic signal which causes 
simultaneous fake photon detections in detector with a frequency  I݂୬୨ୣୡ୲. 
In general, favorable interplay of the two sections (BSR and T1T2) makes the COMBO RNG 
surprisingly robust against detector failure and signal injection attacks. However, some 
deterioration does appear in case of strong deterioration or strong attack conditions. For 
practical applications it would therefore be important if failure and attacks could be detected 
at levels that are far from causing any noticeable randomness deterioration. We studied two 
simple measures: bit generation rate (݂ீ ሻ and blanked events rate ( ஻݂ሻ. Blanked events are 
obtained by logic AND-ing input and output of the blanking circuit in the BSR circuit shown 
in Fig. 2. These events are not used for random number generation. In Fig. 11 ݂ீ  (shown by 
quadratic markers) and ஻݂ (shown by round markers) are plotted for three scenarios studied 
above: (i) D0 and D1 failing simultaneously; (ii) only D0 failing; and (iii) signal injection 
attack. For the first scenario (dotted line) ஽݂ is detection rate of both detectors; for the second 
(dashed line) ஽݂ is the detection rate of detector D0; and for the third (full line) ஽݂ is the 
frequency of injected laser pulses.  
 
 
Fig. 11. Bit generation rate (quadratic dots) and blanked events rate (round dots) as functions of 
detection rates in three failure and attack scenarios (see the text). Both rates are sensitive to 
irregular operation of the RNG this allowing for robust monitoring and failure/attack detection. 
We see that both generation (݂ீ ) and blanked events ( ஻݂) rates are quite sensitive to irregular 
operation of the RNG with possible advantage of ݂ீ  for scenario i and ஻݂for scenario iii 
whereas either is an equally good measure for scenario ii. In the failure scenarios (i and ii) 
both parameters (݂ீ , ஻݂) drop below normal values whereas in the attack scenario (iii) both 
measures rise above their normal values. We thus have two measures, either of which (but 
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preferably both) can be used to robustly alert malfunction of the COMBO RNG at levels at 
which randomness is not noticeably compromised. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A RNG based on quantum effects in photonic emission and detection is presented. A 
mathematical framework for estimation of randomness quality based on simple measurements 
has been developed. The RNG is unique in several aspects: (1) the method of extraction of 
random bits simultaneously uses both spatial and temporal quantum information contained in 
the system; (2) the RNG is robust against hardware failure and signal injection attack in the 
sense that up to some threshold levels of detector failure or attack frequency randomness is 
virtually intact; (3) malfunction of the RNG, due to detector failure or signal injection, can be 
robustly detected at levels at which randomness is not significantly affected thus enabling 
protection of integrity of generated random bits. It is also shown that generated numbers pass 
the NIST Statistical Test Suite (STS) without post-processing. Having in mind that partial 
detector failure scenario is identical to an initial or aging-related difference between detectors, 
one can conclude that COMBO RBG is also robust on initial components variation and aging, 
which makes it a good candidate for mass-production or chip-level QRNG technology.  
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